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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
Beyond its immedate impact of upholding tax exemptions on reli-
gious properties, the importance of Walz lies (1) in its recognition of
benevolence in neutrality and (2) its adoption of the continuing, official
surveillance test. The general nature of these rules quite likely will
reduce the importance in future decisions of the more sweeping and
specific utterances found in the Everson Rule. Adoption of the Walz
Rules undoubtedly adds a new, significant, and substantial element to
church-state questions which means that many hard decisions face the




As the concern for environmental protection mounts, interest in the
use of the private nuisance action as an antipollution weapon has in-
creased.' Two recent cases may have an impact on the continuing use-
fulness of this method of air pollution control. One, a Wisconsin
Supreme Court Case, has reaffirmed the appropriateness of an award of
damages in a private nuisance action regardless of any counterveiling
social utility of the polluter's enterprize. The other, handed down by
the prestigious New York Court of Appeals, has severely limited the
utility of such an action when court-ordered abatement is the only effec-
tive remedy.
Nuisance: Air Pollution and the Doctrine of Comparative Injury:
In Jost v. Dairyland Power Cooperative,' the Wisconsin Supreme
Court allowed money damages in a nuisance action without balancing
the gravity of the harm against the social utility of the offending con-
duct.
lost was an action for damages only, brought by three farmers
against their local electric utility for injury to their crops and land
caused by sulphurous gases emitted into the atmosphere by the power
company's plant. The jury found these emissions to be both a continu-
ing nuisance and the cause of the injury suffered by the plaintiffs and
set the total damage to the plaintiffs' crops at $1,080. The jury also
found a $500 loss of market value to one of the plaintff's farms.
'Recent commentary on the private remedies to environmental pollution includes
the following: Schuck, Air Pollution as a Private Nuisance, 3 Natural Resources
Law 475 (1970); Note, Role of the Private Nuisance Law in the Control of
Air Pollution, 10 ARiz. LAW REv. 107 (1968) ;
Comment, Private Remedies for Water Pollution, 70 COLUM. LAW REv. 734
(1970); Comment, Private Legal Action for Air Pollution, 19 COLUM. LAW
REv. 480 (1970) ; Note, Water Quality Standards in Private Nuisance Actions,
79 YALE LAW J. 102 (1969).
145 Wis. 2d 164, 172 N.W.2d 647 (1969).
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Since the nuisance was found to be continuing, the supreme court
ruled that the injury to the land was permanent. Therefore the supreme
court held it was error not to have found market value loss to all of
the plaintiffs, and a new trial was ordered to determine the dimunition
of market value.2 The supreme court also held that since the defendant
was found to have continued the offending conduct knowing of the na-
ture of the injury it was inflicting, the invasion -was intentional and
that freedom from negligence was no defense to the action.3
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the case was the trial court's
exclusion of evidence of the social utility of the defendant-electric com-
pany's conduct. The supreme court, in reviewing this exclusion, relied
on Pennoyer v. Allen for the proposition that all businesses which as
a necessary result of their operations, contaminate the atmosphere
should be located in such a place as not to cause harm to others.4 But
if not so located, no rule of law could be found which permits an enter-
prise which has caused injury to others to escape liability in damages
because of its superior social and economic importance. 5 The court
reasoned that:
To contend that a public utility, in the pursuit of its praiseworthy
and legitimate enterprise, can, in effect, deprive others of the full
use of their property without compensation, poses a theory un-
known to the law of Wisconsin, and in our opinion would con-
stitute the taking of property without due process of law.6
In holding that the doctrine of comparative injury is not used in Wis-
consin in damage suits the supreme court declared :"We conclude that
injuries caused by air pollution or other nuisance must be compensated
irrespective of the utility of the offending conduct as compared to the
?Id. at 177, 172 N.W.2d at 654. See McCoRncC, DAMAGES § 127 (1935); Hass-
linger v. Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 212, 290 N.W. 647, 652 (1940).
3 45 Wis. 2d at 173-174, 172 N.W.2d at 652. The court relied on PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS § 88 (3d ed. 1964) and the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, § 822 (1939). See also
RESTATEMENT OF ToRTs § 825 (1939) ; Pennoyer v. Allen, 56 Wis. 502, 512, 14
N.W. 609, 613 (1883) ; Brown v. Milwaukee Terminal R. Co., 199 Wis. 575,588-589, 224 N.W. 748, 227 N.W. 385, 386 (1929); Bell v. Gray-RobinsonConstruction Co., 265 Wis. 652, 657, 62 N.W.2d 390, 392-393 (1954); Walley
v. Patake, 271 Wis. 530, 541, 84 N.W.2d 130, 136 (1956). Had the invasionbeen based on negligent instead of intentional conduct, due care would have
been a defense. See Schiro v. Oriental Realty Co., 272 Wis. 537, 546, 76 N.W.2d
355, 359-360 (1956).
4 56 Wis. 502, 512, 14 N.W. 609, 613 (1883). A lawful business may be con-ducted in such a manner as to constitute a nuisance either because of its loca-
tion or because of the effect of its operation. Sohns v. Jensen, 11 Wis. 2d
449, 460, 105 N.W.2d 818, 824 (1960). Generally on the issue of whether thedefendant's conduct was wrongful see the RESTATE-MENT OF TORTS, § 822 (Tent.
Draft No. 15, 1966(; PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 88, 90 (3d ed. 1964); Hasslinger
v. Hartland, supra note 2, at 209-210, 290 N.W. 647, 650-651; Abdella v. Smith,
34 Wis. 2d 393, 399-400, 149 N.W2d 537, 539-540 (1967) ; Dolata v. Berthelet
Fuel & Supply Co., 254 Wis. 194, 198, 36 N.W.2d 97, 99 (1949); Holman v.
Mineral Point Zinc Co., 135 Wis. 132, 136, 115 N.W. 327, 329 (1908).
545 Wis. 2d at 176, 172 N.W.2d at 653.6 Id. at 177, 172 N.W.2d at 653-654.
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injury.'" Therefore, the court found that the exclusion of evidence of
the social significance of the defendant's activity was proper.s However,
it was noted that, where injunctive relief is sought, the court will con-
sider the comparative hardships which will result from the issuance or
denial of the injunction.9
CONCLUSION
In lost, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that
in actions for damages only, the issue of whether or not the defendant
has committed a wrongful act will in no way depend on the utility of
his activity.1" Evidence of the social importance of the offending conduct
could contribute to the danger that the jury will be influenced by extra-
neous matters such as the effect their decision will have on the com-
munity's electric rates. While not a radical departure from existing law
in Wisconsin, the clear decision in lost-that in nuisance actions solely
for damages the plaintiff will be compensated for injuries by the pollu-
tion-nuisance without regard for the social utility of the defendant's
conduct-should provide some measure of relief to injured parties and
some comfort to the environmentalists.
W. CRAIG OLAFSSON
Private Nuisance: Abatement of Air Pollution In Boomer v.
Atlantic Cement Company, Inc:' Landowners brought a private
nuisance action to enjoin the operation of a neighboring cement plant
from polluting the air through the emission of dust and raw materials
and the conducting of excessive blasting in the operation of its plant.
The landowners also sought damages for the nuisance. The lower court
found that a private nuisance did exist and that it had caused the plain-
tiffs substantial injury. The Court of Appeals accepted both findings. 2
The heart of the appeal was the contention by the cement company that
an award of permanent damages, and not an abatement order, was the
proper remedy. Noting the Cement Company represented an invest-
7 Id. at 177, 172 N.W.2d at 654.8 Id. at 176, 172 N.W.2d at 653.
9 Id. at 177, 172 N.W.2d at 654. See Dolata v. Berthelet Fuel Supply Co., supra
note 4, at198-199, 36 N.W.2d at 99; Holman v. Mineral Point Zinc Co., supra
note 4, at 137, 115 N.W. at 329; Abdella v. Smith, supra note 4, at 398-400,
149 N.W.2d at 539-540.
10 45 Wis. 2d at 177, 172 N.W.2d at 654. The rule was first propounded in Wis-
consin in 1883 in Pennoyer v. Allen, supra note 3.
1309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
2 Id., at 315.
3 The court found that the rate of technical advances in the reduction of parti-
culate contamination was beyond the control of the defendant, and in fact
depended on the total resources of the industry. To demand that this defend-
ant either discover a technical solution within a short time or cease operation,
reasoned the court, would be both unrealistic and unfair. Accordingly, the
court ordered the trial to issue an injunction which was to be vacated upon
payment by the defendant of such permanent damages as the lower court
would find.
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